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ABSTRACT 
Profitable Horizontal Mergers without Cost Advantages: 
The Role of Internal Organization, Information, and Market Structure  
by Steffen Huck, Kai A. Konrad and Wieland Müller 
Merged firms are typically rather complex organizations. Accordingly, merger has a 
more profound effect on the structure of a market than simply reducing the number of 
competitors. We show that this may render horizontal mergers profitable and welfare – 
improving even if costs are linear. The driving force behind these results, which help to 
reconcile theory with various empirical findings, is the assumption that information 
about output decisions flows more freely within a merged firm. 
 
Keywords: Merger, internal organizational structure, information, timing, market structure 
JEL classification: L11, L13, L22, L41 
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Profitable Unternehmensfusionen ohne Kostenvorteile: 
Die Rolle der internen Unternehmensorganisation, des Informationsflusses und 
der Marktstruktur 
Unternehmensfusionen führen häufig zu komplexen Organisationen. Fusionen haben 
deshalb andere und tiefgründige Wirkungen auf die Marktstruktur. Sie reduzieren nicht 
einfach die Zahl der Wettbewerber in einem Markt, sondern durch Fusionen entstehen 
Wettbewerber, die sich wegen ihrer komplexen Organisationsstruktur anders verhalten 
als jedes der einzelnen Unternehmen vor der Fusion. Wir zeigen in dieser Arbeit, dass 
horizontale Fusion von Unternehmen aus diesen Gründen profitabel für die 
fusionierenden Unternehmen und wohlfahrtserhöhend wirken kann, selbst dann, wenn 
es durch die Fusion keinerlei Kostensynergien gibt. Der Schlüssel für dieses Ergebnis, 
das eine Theorie für eine Reihe von empirischen Befunden liefert, ist der verbesserte 
Informationsfluss zwischen Unternehmensteilen des durch die Fusion entstehenden 
Konzerns im Vergleich zum Informationsfluss zwischen unabhängigen Unternehmen. 
 
Schlüsselbegriffe: Fusion, Organisationsstruktur, Informationsfluss, Marktstruktur 
1 Introduction
Although merger of two …rms is frequently dubbed “fusion”, this term
is quite misleading. In contrast to the fusion of atoms, the new entity
that results from a merger of two …rms is usually a much more intricate
structure than either of the two …rms. Through merger …rms do not just
become “bigger” they also become more complex organizations. This
is empirically well documented. Prechel, Boies, and Woods (1999), for
example, report that newly merged …rms mostly move from the classi-
cal multidivisional form1 to the so–called multisubsidiary organizational
form, where the old …rms are kept as still fully functional a¢liates.2
The economics literature generally ignores such organizational issues
and models a merger either as a fusion or as perfect collusion. In this
paper we depart from both and draw on the above …ndings by modeling
a merged …rm as a …rm with separately managed subsidiaries. We ana-
lyze how this a¤ects market structure, pro…tability of …rms and welfare.
The main assumptions we make about mergers are very minimalistic.
Instead of assuming “synergies” or cost reductions that render mergers
pro…table, we simply assume that within a merged …rm information is
exchanged more easily than between other …rms.3 More speci…cally, we
follow the observations by Prechel, Boies, and Woods (1999) according
to which merging …rms become a¢liates in a holding company, with
each a¢liate having the discretion to make independent decisions, and
we assume that, due to the many formal and informal links between
these a¢liates, one a¢liate’s production plans can be observed by the
other a¢liate before this information is observable for …rms that do not
belong to the same holding company. Moreover, we allow for some time
structure in production decisions. As a consequence, an a¢liate among
the merged …rms might be able to observe the output decision of its
“sibling” before deciding about its own output.
As innocent as this assumption may seem, it has dramatic consequences—
for the two merging …rms as well as for the market as a whole. In par-
ticular, we …nd that merger is pro…table for the involved …rms, reduces
pro…ts of outsiders and enhances welfare. All three results are in sharp
contrast with the literature on mergers in markets with quantity com-
1Chandler (1962) is usually credited for having been the …rst to conceptualize the
“M-form”. A further classical reference is Cyert and March (1963).
2Zey and Swenson (1999) report similar …ndings.
3 In a recent article, Nault and Tyagi (2000) argue that improved communication
technologies make horizontal alliances and other horizontal organization structures
more attractive and more prevalent than traditional centralised structures. Nault
and Tyagi take this is a starting point for modelling coordination mechanisms in
alliances of geographically dispersed …rms.
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petition that originated with Salant, Switzer, and Reynolds (1983) and
help at the same time to reconcile theory with three stylized facts:
² There is no clear evidence for welfare reductions as a consequence
of mergers, welfare changes go in both directions (see, for exam-
ple, Pesendorfer 2000 who reports huge welfare gains for mergers
in the paper industry and, for a general appraisal, Federal Trade
Commission 1999).
² Competitors often su¤er when other …rms merge (see, for example,
Banerjee and Eckard 1998).
² (Bilateral) mergers are observed in all industries, even in those
where costs are unlikely to be convex (see O¢ce of Fair Trading
1999).
There is a vast body of theoretical literature on mergers and some
strands of it can accommodate some of these …ndings. For example,
Deneckere and Davidson (1985) show that bilateral merger in Bertrand
markets is pro…table. This can explain why we observe bilateral mergers.
However, they also show that merger in these markets reduces consumer
welfare and that competitors bene…t if other …rms merge.4
The literature on mergers in markets with quantity competition (Cournot
markets)5 is, however, at odds with all three observations. In Cournot
markets mergers have only two consequences: First, they reduce the
number of …rms (or strategic players) acting in the market as mergers
are indeed modelled as a fusion after which one …rm has disappeared.
Second, if costs are non-linear, they may change the cost function of the
newly merged …rm. This has a number of important implications:
² Mergers are only welfare–improving if …rms are asymmetric and
output is shifted from less to more e¢cient …rms (Farrell and
Shapiro 1990).
² Competitors bene…t if other …rms merge (Salant, Switzer, and
Reynolds 1983).
² Bilateral mergers are only pro…table if costs are su¢ciently convex
(Perry and Porter 1985).
4Cabral (1999) shows that merger in markets with di¤erentiated products may
increase consumer welfare if there is the possibility of free entry.
5At …rst sight quantity competition might be seen as of lesser importance than
price competition. However, as Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) show standard Cournot
analysis might be interpreted as a shortcut to analysing markets where …rms have to
build up capacities and then engage in price competition.
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A corollary to this is that bilateral mergers in linear markets are
never pro…table and always welfare–reducing.6 Consequently, one should
observe mergers only if the cost savings are su¢ciently large which seems
to be in con‡ict with the third observation above—that there is merger
activity in all industries regardless of speci…c production technologies.
Cost e¤ects are very hard to observe and measure. Accordingly, it is
di¢cult or impossible to test this theory. In order to eliminate possible
production cost e¤ects from our consideration we will consider the case
with linear cost.7 We propose a di¤erent reasoning that resolves the
puzzle but is based on assumptions can be tested more easily. As we
shall show, the puzzle can be resolved by taking into consideration that
merger is not a process that transforms two …rms into one …rm of the
same type, basically eliminating one of the …rms, but rather leads to
a di¤erent organization: merged …rms are kept as intact decision units
within a more complex entity.
Our analysis comes in two parts. In the …rst part we assume that
the merged …rm has a joint headquarter that can govern its a¢liates. In
particular, we assume that the HQ can enforce the sequence in which its
two a¢liates decide about their output. For example, the HQ can force
one a¢liate to decide before the other (which then, because informa-
tion ‡ows freely between the two a¢liates, will be informed about the
quantity of its sibling when making its own decision). This has an im-
portant consequence for the market as a whole because the market will
no longer be a simple Cournot market. Rather, the market will have the
‡avor of a Stackelberg market as the a¢liate that decides …rst becomes
some sort of Stackelberg leader. Of course, this leadership is partial as
the outsiders will not be able to observe what the second-moving a¢liate
can observe. Accounting for this pattern we will introduce the following
terminology. We shall call the …rst-moving a¢liate of the merged …rm
a “partial Stackelberg leader” and the second moving a¢liate a “partial
Stackelberg follower” (or the “informed …rm”). To all the other …rms we
shall refer as “Cournot …rms” (or the “uninformed …rms”). Analyzing
this market we arrive at the above mentioned main conclusions: mergers
can be pro…table and welfare–improving even if all …rms have the same
linear cost functions. At the same time competitors’ pro…ts are reduced.
In the second part of our analysis we will relax the assumption about
6This was …rst pointed out by Salant, Switzer, and Reynolds (1983).
7This assumption is mainly for purity. We will show that merger will be pro…table
and welfare enhancing, even with a linear technology. This result implies that, if there
are additional “synergies” (e.g., cost savings due to the convexity of cost funtions)
the merger will be even more pro…table. In other words, by focussing on linear
technologies we do not restrict the generality of our analysis but rather focus on the
hardest case, and a generalization to cases with “synergies” is straightforward.
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the all-powerful joint headquarter. In fact, we shall completely abandon
it (which might even more closely resemble a multisubsidiary form) and
we will show that even in the absence of a headquarter, the same tim-
ing of decisions that the headquarter would enforce, will endogenously
evolve. Consequently, the same Stackelberg commitment power will re-
sult endogenously and, hence, the same market outcome. Thus, even if
the merged …rm does not bene…t from “commitment by governance” it
will increase its joint pro…t.
The model we employ in the second part of our analysis is closely
related to the literature on endogenous timing in Stackelberg markets. It
closely follows Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) who show that two perfectly
symmetric …rms may endogenously play according to the Stackelberg
solution. This happens in a two-period model in which both …rms can
commit themselves to a quantity in the …rst period. Alternatively, they
can decide to wait and produce in the second period (then knowing
the other …rm’s decision). The only subgameperfect equilibria in this
market game that are in undominated strategies are characterized by
Stackelberg behavior.8
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we
present the basic model and the benchmark case without merger. In
Section 3 we describe the equilibrium outcome if …rms merge and are
governed by a headquarter that can impose rules for them. In Section 4
we abandon this assumption and study the model in which the timing of
moves is endogenous. Finally, Section 5 summarizes and discusses our
results.
2 The benchmark case without merger
We consider a market for a homogenous product with linear demand and
cost. Let there be n symmetric …rms. We can normalize price and unit
such that inverse demand can be written as p(X) = maxf1¡X; 0g with
X =
Pn
i=1 xi denoting total supply and xi …rm i’s individual quantity.
Each …rm chooses its supply quantity according to the following game
structure. There are two production periods. A …rm can choose to
produce either in period 1 or in period 2. Production costs do not
depend on whether a …rm decides to produce early (in ‘period 1’) or late
(in ‘period 2’). Only after period 2, that is, when all …rms have chosen
their outputs, can each …rm observe each other …rm’s output decision
and the market opens. This re‡ects that production and sale do not
take place instantaneously (what is assumed in most of the economics
8The main reason for this result is that playing Cournot quantities in the …rst
period is a dominated action. (By waiting a …rm can always react optimally to what
its competitor has done previously.)
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literature). Rather production takes some time and precedes selling.
However, although actual output decisions may not necessarily occur
simultaneously, due to simultaneous information revelation, the output
choice in the benchmark case is a standard Cournot–Nash game. Ac-
cordingly, the unique Cournot equilibrium is given by x¤i =
1
n+1. Total
supply is given byX = nn+1 and the equilibrium price by p =
1
n+1. Firms’
pro…ts are 1(n+1)2 .
Note that the choice of timing of production is inconsequential in
this benchmark case: Given the information assumptions, the benchmark
case is structurally equivalent with the standard Cournot model with n
symmetric …rms. However, the additional choice of timing allows for
more structure within more complex organizational forms. This is what
we consider next.
3 Model A: A headquarter governs merged …rms
Suppose two of the n …rms merge. A “holding” is formed with a joint
headquarter and decision making units in each of the two a¢liates, la-
belled L and I. As discussed brie‡y in the introduction, the governance
structure in the merged …rms is characterized by two properties. First,
information ‡ows more easily and quickly between the merged a¢li-
ates than between other …rms. More precisely, we assume that the two
merged …rms can observe each other’s output decision immediately when
it occurs. Second, the headquarter controls the sequencing of output de-
cisions of the two a¢liates and can force a¢liate L to choose xL prior to
a¢liate I’s decision. Hence, when I chooses xI, it knows the choice xL
made by a¢liate L. Of course, all other …rms observe xL and xI only at
the end of period 2, at the same time when L and I also observe these
other …rms’ output choices. This structure is common knowledge. We
refer to a merger that results in a holding with two a¢liates and this in-
formation and decision structure as a merger with enforced information
sharing.
The game which results after the merger has taken place is a sequen-
tial game without proper subgames. It can be interpreted as a market
with “partial Stackelberg leadership” and we refer to the …rm in the
merger which moves …rst (L) as the “leader”. To the second …rm in the
merger (I) we refer to as the “informed …rm”. To all other …rms we refer
to as the “uninformed …rms”, indexed u 2 U .
While a strategy of the leader is simply a number, its quantity xL,
the informed …rm’s strategy is a function prescribing for each possible
quantity of the leader a quantity of its own. We denote this function
by f(xL). A strategy of one of the uninformed …rms prescribes, strictly
speaking, the period in which to produce and the quantity that is pro-
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duced in this period. However, as an uninformed …rm’s quantity decision
is not revealed until the end of period 2, its choice of period is irrelevant.
Hence, we can simplify an uninformed …rm’s strategy to a number, its
quantity xu.
This game has an in…nite number of Nash equilibria, similar to a
standard Stackelberg game. In contrast to a standard Stackelberg game
the number of equilibria cannot be reduced by simple backward induc-
tion, i.e., by requiring subgame perfection. However, by requiring that
the informed …rm reacts optimally to its information, i.e., by requiring
sequential rationality we can achieve a unique solution.
As the derivation of the sequentially rational equilibrium is slightly
tedious we refer the full analysis of the game into the Appendix. The
results are this: The leader supplies x¤L =
2
n+2. Uninformed …rms choose
x¤u =
1
n+2. And the informed …rm chooses the function f
¤(xL) = 2n+2 ¡
1
2xL which yields in equilibrium x
¤
I =
1
n+2.
At …rst sight it may seem surprising that uninformed …rms choose
the same quantity as the informed …rm. After all, one might have sus-
pected that the informed …rm “su¤ers” more from its knowledge about
the leader’s quantity than the uninformed …rms do. However, in equi-
librium this cannot happen. The key to understanding this property is
the following observation: In equilibrium all …rms know the quantities
of all other …rms. (Of course, about the informed …rm they only know
the equilibrium function f ¤(xL), but since they know x¤L they also know
x¤I.) Thus, each uninformed …rm has to maximize xu(1¡X¤¡u) with X ¤¡u
being the total quantity of all …rms except u. At the same time the
informed …rm has to choose f(xL) such that xi(1¡X¤¡i) is maximized.
But this implies that the …rst order conditions for uninformed …rms and
the informed …rms are symmetric and xi = xu must hold in equilibrium.
Having solved the market game after the merger we can now proceed
by analyzing a) whether this merger is pro…table, b) whether it decreases
or increases welfare, and c) how it a¤ects the pro…ts of the merged …rms’
competitors. All questions are not hard to answer.
In order to analyze the pro…tability of the merger we have to compare
the joint pro…t of the two …rms before and after they merge. Before, the
joint pro…t is 2
(n+1)2
. After, it is 3
(n+2)2
. (Simply note that the price
after the merger is 1n+2 .) Thus, the change in pro…ts is
3
(n+2)2 ¡ 2(n+1)2 =
n2¡2n¡5
(n+2)2(n+1)2
which is positive if n2 ¡ 2n¡ 5 > 0, i.e., if n ¸ 4.
In order to analyze social welfare it is (due to linearity) su¢cient to
compare the induced change in total quantities which is n+1
n+2
¡ n
n+1
=
1
(n+2)(n+1)
and unambiguously positive. Thus, the merger is welfare im-
proving. Finally, we …nd that a competitor’s pro…t is unambiguously
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reduced (from 1(n+1)2 to
1
(n+2)2 ).
We summarize our results in
Proposition 1 In symmetric linear Cournot markets with at least four
…rms a merger with enforced information sharing is pro…table and welfare–
improving. Furthermore, it reduces competitors’ pro…ts.
4 Model B: Merger without headquarter
We take the same setup as above. Each of the two merged …rms max-
imizes its own pro…t. The only aspect we alter is that the two merged
…rms must now autonomously decide in which period to produce. Thus,
we shall speak of a merger with endogenous information sharing.9 Let
the two merged …rms be indexed by j. Then a merged …rm’s strategy is
a 3-tuple (x1i ; fi(x1j); x2i ) where x1i either speci…es an output for period 1
or indicates that the …rm waits, i.e. x1i 2 R [ fWg with W indicating
the decision to wait. The function f (x1j) is a mappingR !R specifying
the …rm’s reaction in case it has decided to wait while the other …rm has
chosen x1j 6= W . Finally, x2i speci…es …rm i’s quantity decision for the
case that both …rms have decided to wait.10 An uninformed …rm’s strat-
egy can, as above, be simply described by a number, i.e., its quantity
choice xu that is taken in either of the two periods.11
We focus on equilibria in pure strategies. Some observations about
possible subgame perfect equilibria of this game can be made.
1. If one of the merged …rms decides to wait, the other will produce in
the …rst period. (The waiting …rm will adjust its output to the …rst
mover’s quantity or, to put it di¤erently, regardless of the behavior
of the uninformed …rms there is a Stackelberg-leader advantage.)
2. In any subgameperfect equilibrium in which the two merged …rms
produce in the …rst period all …rms produce standard Cournot
9This term does not preclude that merged …rms won’t share information. However,
as we will show below, they will.
1 0Note that, as Hamilton and Slutsky (1990), we rule out that a …rm which has
chosen to produce in the …rst period can produce again in the second period. This
assumption can be justi…ed by assuming that …rms have to make some arrangements
for production actually to take place and that, consequently, producing in two periods
instead of one causes …xed costs the …rms wish to avoid. However, our results are
nevertheless robust in the sense that allowing production in two periods would still
yield the same outcomes (see Ellingsen, 1995, for details).
1 1As before, the timing of a …rm not involved in the merger is irrelevant, as infor-
mation about output decisions before the end of period 2 is available only within the
merged …rm, i.e., an uninformed …rm can neither observe the output of others at the
end of period 1 nor can its output, if it produces in period 1, be observed by others
before the end of period 2.
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quantities 1n+1. (Otherwise some …rm would obviously not play a
best reply.)
3. All …rms producing Cournot quantities in the …rst period is an
equilibrium in dominated strategies. (For one of the merged …rms,
playing Cournot in the …rst period can never be better than wait-
ing. On the other hand, waiting can clearly be better than playing
Cournot.)
4. If one of the merged …rms decides to wait, i.e., decides to produce in
the second period, it will produce the same equilibrium quantity as
each uninformed …rm. (This follows from the same logic as above.)
Taken together, these observations dramatically narrow down the set
of possible solutions. Most importantly, we …nd that (i), (ii), and (iii)
imply that one of the merged …rms has to move …rst while the other has
to wait. This implies that the same market structure results as in the
case with a headquarter. Consequently, the …rms will also produce the
same quantities such that we get identical market outcomes as in the
case with a headquarter.
Proposition 2 In symmetric linear Cournot markets with at least four
…rms a merger with endogenous information sharing is pro…table and
welfare–improving. Furthermore, it reduces competitors’ pro…ts.
5 Discussion
Empirical evidence on the e¤ects of mergers is mixed even where stan-
dard theory makes unambiguous predictions. For example, Banerjee and
Eckard (1998) …nd that during the …rst great merger wave from 1897 to
1903 competitors of merging …rms su¤ered signi…cant losses which is in-
consistent with the traditional modelling of mergers. The observation
is, however, consistent with our approach which predicts such losses.
Our approach also predicts the opposite of standard models with
respect to the pro…tability of mergers in a market with linear costs and
with respect to their welfare implications. As the new wave of mergers
still is irresistible we observe mergers in virtually all kinds of markets,
including those where the linear–cost assumption seems well–justi…ed. In
the traditional approach where one …rm “disappears” after a merger this
is puzzling. But empirical evidence clearly shows that …rms acquiring
other …rms typically keep target management (Hubbard and Palia 1999)
and that the multisubsidiary form (which is implicitly assumed in our
model) is the standard organizational form of a merged …rm (see, for
example, Prechel, Boies, and Woods 1999 or Zey and Swenson 1999).
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As we have shown, such an organizational form may have a signi…cant
impact on the structure of the market which provides a new rationale
for mergers.
In the …rst part of our analysis we show that if a joint headquarter
can govern the (timing) decisions of its a¢liates this may render a merger
pro…table even in the absence of cost advantages through the merger.
One assumption drives this result— within a merged …rm information
‡ows more quickly and freely, and, due to this, clever governance can
induce a commitment advantage for the merged …rm even if no other
…rm can observe what its a¢liates are doing. In the second part of our
analysis we abandon the assumption of a headquarter and show that, if
all …rms are free to choose when to produce, the same market structure
results as in the presence of a headquarter governing the merged …rm. As
in Hamilton and Slutsky’s (1990) model of endogenous timing (which our
model generalizes by adding uninformed …rms) we observe endogenous
(partial) Stackelberg leadership. Thus, it turns out that two simple
assumptions which both seem quite realistic make a merger pro…table—
the assumption that production does not take place at one and the same
instant for all …rms and that, as pointed out above, a merger may create
information channels through which a¢liated …rms can observe what
other a¢liates do.
The policy implications of our analysis are twofold: Socially, merg-
ers may be more welcome than traditional views suggest. This, how-
ever, may depend on the organizational form merged companies choose.
Hence, in judging the (anti)competitive e¤ect of mergers governing bod-
ies may wish to be regardful of how the merged …rm plans to operate.
On a more general level, the model suggests that one can only fully
understand the consequences of merger when carefully considering its
consequences for market structure. If one does, the standard view that
mergers have to induce cost advantages to be pro…table and/or welfare–
improving is no longer warranted.
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To solve the game of Section 3 let us proceed step by step.
First, consider an uninformed …rm u and let XU denote total output
of all uninformed …rms. Its best–reply correspondence assigns to each
possible combination of xL, f(xL) and XUnu =
P
i2Unfug xi a unique
quantity xu which maximizes xu(1 ¡ xL ¡ f(xL) ¡XU). Thus …rm u’s
best reply is given by
x¤u =
1
2
(1¡ xL ¡ f(xL)¡XUnu): (1)
The informed …rm’s best–reply correspondence assigns to each pos-
sible combination of xL and XU a function f such that f(xL)(1¡ xL ¡
f(xL) ¡XU) is maximized. Therefore,
f¤(xL) =
1
2
(1¡ xL ¡XU) (2)
has to hold. It is important to notice that there is for each combination
of xL and XU an in…nite number of functions f¤ ful…lling this condition.
The best–reply correspondence only demands that f¤ assumes a certain
value at one particular point and says nothing about the shape of the
function elsewhere. Obviously, this is the reason for the multiplicity of
equilibria.
However, requiring sequential rationality narrows down the set of
functions for …rm I . Sequential rationality demands that …rm i reacts
optimally in all its information sets. As the information sets of …rm I
are single–valued there are no problems of specifying I ’s beliefs. Firm I
can only react to what it knows about xL. Taking into account that (2)
has to hold, this implies that …rm i must choose a function of the form
f¤(xL) = Z ¡ xL2 : (3)
In essence, this means that, demanding sequential rationality, we now
can analyze a “truncated game” where Z is …rm I’s only choice variable.
This means that we can rewrite (1) and (2) as follows. For a …rm u
x¤u =
1
2
(1 ¡ 1
2
xL ¡ Z ¡XUnu) (4)
has to hold and for …rm I
Z¤ =
1
2
(1¡XU): (5)
Notice that (5) ensures uniqueness.
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Next, we can focus on the leader L. In the truncated game its best–
reply correspondence assigns to each combination of Z and XU a unique
quantity xL maximizing xL(1¡ 12xL¡ Z ¡XU). Accordingly,
x¤L = 1¡ Z ¡XU: (6)
Using the symmetry of the uninformed …rms, we can now solve the
following simultaneous equations
x¤u =
1
2(1¡ 12x¤L ¡ Z¤¡ (n¡ 3)x¤u)
Z¤ = 12(1¡ (n¡ 2)x¤u)
x¤L = 1¡ Z¤ ¡ (n¡ 2)x¤u
(7)
which gives x¤u =
1
n+2
; x¤L =
2
n+2
; and Z¤ = 2
n+2
. The implies that the
informed …rm chooses f¤(xL) = 2n+2 ¡ 12xL which yields in equilibrium
x¤I =
1
n+2 .
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